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ESSAY 
DELEGATION TO NONEXPERTS 
EVAN C. ZOLDAN† 
When a legislature delegates authority to an agency or a private party, the 
delegate typically has expertise in the subject matter of the delegation. But, while 
delegation to experts is the rule, a legislature can also delegate authority to an 
institution without expertise in the areas it regulates. This Essay evaluates the 
phenomenon of delegation to nonexperts. It concludes that the accountability concerns 
that infect delegation generally are more acute in the context of nonexperts. 
Conversely, the self-dealing concerns associated with private delegates are minimal 
for nonexpert delegates. Finally, the risk is considerable that nonexpert delegation will 
lead to arbitrary regulation. These conclusions should inform how our legislatures 
delegate authority and how courts review actions taken by nonexpert delegates. 
INTRODUCTION 
The ambitious policy goals we set for our governments demand that they 
develop a great deal of expertise. We want drinking water to be clean and 
prescription drugs to be safe, but we don’t expect legislators themselves to 
spend years learning about water chemistry and pharmacology before they 
legislate. It is unrealistic to expect members of a popularly elected body to 
have the breadth and depth of knowledge needed to address emergent social 
problems in a timely and effective way. Instead, we trust that bodies acting 
on the legislature’s behalf, like administrative agencies, have the technical 
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knowledge—including knowledge of chemistry, engineering, economics, and 
law—necessary to accomplish the goals the legislature entrusts to them.1 
Normally, our expectations about agency expertise are justified. The Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) employ epidemiologists to monitor 
public health.2 And the Federal Highway Administration employs civil 
engineers to design roads and bridges.3 Across the government, in fact, agencies 
employ an army of experts, from economists to medical doctors to nuclear 
physicists.4 With this level of expertise available to the agencies, it is not 
surprising that legislatures leave so much policymaking authority in their hands. 
How, then, should we react when the legislature entrusts policymaking 
authority to nonexperts? Does delegation to nonexperts raise the same 
concerns as delegation generally? What additional concerns does it raise? 
These are the questions that this Essay answers. 
Now is the right time to consider the consequences of delegation to 
nonexperts. As COVID-19 infections rage, the country is locked in a fierce 
debate about how much deference experts deserve. While most Americans 
report having at least “a fair amount” of confidence that scientists act in the 
public interest,5 a strong strain of populist6 (or even nihilist)7 sentiment 
rejecting expertise has informed public policy during the pandemic. What’s 
more, as this popular debate has unfolded, some high-ranking government 
 
1 See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers 
Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1179 (1999) (describing functional advantages of delegation). 
2 See Sara M. Benson, Guidance for Improving the Federal Response to Foodborne Illness Outbreaks 
Associated with Fresh Produce, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 503, 506 (2010) (describing the role of CDC 
epidemiologists in tracing foodborne illness). 
3 See Bridges & Structures, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., https://fhwa.dot.gov/ 
bridge [https://perma.cc/7LC9-2ES3] (last updated June 22, 2020) (describing engineering teams employed 
by the Federal Highway Administration). 
4 See e.g., Fiona Hill, Public Service and the Federal Government, BROOKINGS INST. (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/public-service-and-the-federal-government/ 
[https://perma.cc/BEZ6-FFZB] (“[F]ederal government professionals and administrators form a standing 
force, a permanent cadre of experts that maintains the continuity of core U.S. government operations .	.	.	.”). 
5 CARY FUNK, MEG HEFFERON, BRIAN KENNEDY & COURTNEY JOHNSON, PEW RSCH CTR., 
TRUST AND MISTRUST IN AMERICANS’ VIEWS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS, 6-7 (2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2019/08/02/trust-and-mistrust-in-americans-views-of-scientific-
experts [https://perma.cc/T5ZU-XBA2] (providing data about public trust in scientific experts). 
6 Scott Leigh, Time to End Populism’s War on Expertise, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 7, 2020, 4:55 PM), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/04/07/opinion/time-end-populisms-war-expertise [https://perma.cc/ 
K9GY-7A8X] (connecting the continued COVID-19 crisis to popular rejection of scientific expertise). 
7 Ross Douthat, In the Fog of Coronavirus, There Are No Experts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/opinion/coronavirus-science-experts.html [https://perma.cc/ 
K4UT-7H79] (opining that there are no experts on coronavirus). 
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officials have sought notoriety by conspicuously ignoring the advice of 
experts8 or actively undermining their credibility.9 
Clashes over the role of expertise in policy formulation are fought with 
increasing frequency in the Supreme Court as well. In a number of contexts, 
the Court recently has signaled a willingness to limit the influence of agency 
expertise, both by emphasizing political accountability over agency 
independence and by deemphasizing the role of agencies in statutory 
interpretation.10 But, the Court’s most momentous rebalancing of political 
accountability and expertise may still be yet to come. The federal nondelegation 
doctrine, meant to restrain overbroad delegations, has been dormant for more 
than eight decades, leading most scholars to declare it dead.11 In its 2019 
decision in Gundy v. United States,12 however, the Supreme Court radically 
altered the prognosis of the nondelegation doctrine. In Gundy, the Court 
narrowly upheld a broad delegation of authority to the Attorney General to 
make key policy decisions about the application of a federal statute.13 However, 
four justices expressed a willingness to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine 
to strike down a congressional delegation of authority.14 With Justice 
Kavanaugh expected to join their ranks the next time the Court takes up a 
nondelegation issue,15 the likelihood of a revival of the doctrine is high for the 
 
8 Press Release, White House, Press Briefing by Vice President Pence and Members of the 
White House Coronavirus Task Force (July 14, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/press-briefing-vice-president-pence-members-white-house-coronavirus-task-force-
baton-rouge-la/ [https://perma.cc/A35N-TYUE] (“We don’t want CDC guidance to be a reason why 
people don’t reopen their schools .	.	.	.”). 
9 Aaron Blake, ‘We Just Need Some More Optimism’: Rand Paul’s Crusade Against Anthony Fauci Takes a 
Curious Turn, WASH. POST (June 30, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/30/we-
just-need-some-more-optimism-rand-pauls-crusade-against-anthony-fauci-take-curious-turn/ 
[https://perma.cc/BH9C-S3BC] (describing Rand Paul’s public attack on Anthony Fauci). 
10 See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (invalidating the structure of CFPB, 
further concentrating executive power in the president); Kisor v. Wilke, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) 
(reaffirming that courts must not defer reflexively to agency interpretations); Lucia v. S.E.C., 138 S. Ct. 
2044 (2018) (holding that S.E.C. Administrative Law Judges are officers who must be appointed in 
accordance with the Appointments Clause rather than through a civil service process); King v. Burwell, 
576 U.S. 473, 486 (2014) (holding that Congress did not intend to assign “a question of deep ‘economic 
and political significance’” to an agency because it did not do so expressly (internal citation omitted)). 
11 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding 
the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 145 (2005) (“The most recent attempt to revive 
the [nondelegation] doctrine was resoundingly rejected by the Supreme Court, and .	.	. Congress 
routinely delegates policy decisions of comparable or greater importance to administrative agencies.”). 
12 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
13 Id. at 2130. 
14 Id. at 2130-31 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
15 Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the denial 
of certiorari) (expressing an interest in revisiting the nondelegation doctrine in future cases); see also 
Evan C. Zoldan, Gundy v. United States: A Peek into the Future of Government Regulation, THE HILL 
(June 21, 2019, 12:24 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/449687-gundy-v-united-states-a-
peek-into-the-future-of-government-regulation [https://perma.cc/9H5R-U7H5]. 
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first time since 1935.16 As it works out the contours of the revived nondelegation 
doctrine in the coming years, the Court should consider the unique 
characteristics of delegation to nonexperts. Moreover, these characteristics 
should inform both policymakers deciding how to delegate authority and lower 
courts deciding how to review actions taken by nonexpert delegates. 
Part II describes the familiar phenomenon of delegation to experts, 
including agency delegation and delegation to private parties. Agency 
delegation is often criticized for diminishing political accountability and for 
harming liberty interests. Critics of private delegations reiterate the concern 
about accountability and add a concern about self-dealing. 
Part III introduces the concept of delegation to nonexperts, which, until 
now, has not been identified by courts or scholars as a distinct form of 
delegation. Although atypical, the legislature can delegate authority to 
institutions without expertise in the subject matter of the delegation. 
Delegation to nonexperts does not occur simply when an agency takes the 
views of nonexperts into consideration.17 Rather, delegation to nonexperts 
takes place when a body that lacks institutional expertise in the subject matter 
of the delegation is vested with authority by the legislature. To illustrate the 
concept of delegation to nonexperts, Part III describes the composition and 
functions of the recently created Michigan Environmental Rules Review 
Committee, a body with significant rulemaking authority but with limited 
institutional expertise in the subject matter over which it has responsibility.18 
Part IV evaluates delegation to nonexperts by contrasting it with agency 
and private delegation. The concern that agency and private delegates lack 
sufficient political accountability is even more pronounced in the case of 
nonexpert delegates. By contrast, the self-dealing concern that attends 
private delegations is diminished for delegation to nonexperts. Finally, and 
most importantly, delegation to nonexperts is apt to lead not merely to 
inexpert regulation, but to arbitrary regulation. 
Part V concludes by laying out a path for future research. This Essay 
provides only a brief sketch of delegation to nonexperts and does not purport 
to be the last word on the subject. Future work in the area of delegation to 
nonexperts should include: how delegation to nonexperts relates to the 
suspicion of expertise in fields like medicine, science, and law; whether a 
revived nondelegation doctrine should apply to delegations to nonexperts; 
 
16 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
17 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (“An agency must consider and 
respond to significant comments received during the period for public comment.”). 
18 See S. 652 §	65(2), 99th Leg., Reg. Session (Mich. 2018) (requiring qualifications for each 
voting member of the Michigan Environmental Rules Review Committee). 
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and whether delegation to nonexperts risks damaging the ability of agencies 
to regulate by diminishing their reputations as experts. 
II.  DELEGATION TO EXPERTS 
Although counterintuitive, it is entirely rational for a legislature to give up 
some of its power by vesting authority in other actors. Among other reasons,19 
the legislature often delegates authority to take advantage of the delegate’s 
subject-matter expertise.20 Unlike legislators, whose time and attention can be 
stretched thin because of obligations to constituents and electoral demands, a 
delegate that devotes “extended time and attention to specific problems” can 
develop expertise in the particular subject matter of the statutes it interprets 
and enforces.21 For example, the Food and Drug Administration relies on a 
staff that includes scientists with expertise in chemistry and pharmacology22 
when reviewing applications for new drugs under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA).23 Similarly, Congress uses the term “drug” throughout 
the FDCA but delegates the definition of this key term to the United States 
Pharmacopeia,24 a private group composed of members from academia, 
consumer and manufacturer groups, and scientific associations, which sets 
quality, purity, and strength standards for medicines.25 
 
19 Other reasons include efficiency and deflection of responsibility. See Rossi, supra note 1 at 
1179 (noting the cost-effectiveness of delegation). See generally Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: 
How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463 (2015) (arguing that, 
through delegation, Congress can take credit for addressing problems and then shift the blame to 
agencies for creating regulatory costs). 
20 Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their 
Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 179 (1989). 
21 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and 
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 401 (2006). 
22 David W. Jordan, International Regulatory Harmonization: A New Era in Prescription Drug 
Approval, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 471, 482 (1992) (“The FDA staff, representing various scientific 
disciplines, including medicine, pharmacology, and chemistry, reviews the data in the application.”). 
23 See 21 U.S.C. §	355(a) (requiring submission and approval of application before new drugs 
may be introduced into interstate commerce). 
24 See id. §	321(g)(1) (providing that “drug” means “articles recognized in the official United 
States Pharmacopoeia [sic]”). 
25 What is the U.S. Pharmacopeia?, U.S. PHARMACOPEIA (Aug. 4, 2015), https://qualitymatters.usp.org/ 
what-us-pharmacopeia [https://perma.cc/7B3E-4UML] (explaining that “USP sets quality, purity, 
strength, and identity standards for medicines” and its members “come from academia, health care, 
governmental agencies” and other industries). 
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Delegation of authority to experts has been widely26 (though not 
universally)27 criticized. The criticisms that are leveled against delegation 
vary with the status of the delegate. When the legislature delegates authority 
to administrative agencies, it is often criticized for compromising political 
accountability and harming liberty interests. When the legislature delegates 
authority to private parties, critics’ primary concerns are the specter of self-
dealing and a heightened concern about political accountability. 
A.  Delegation to Administrative Agencies 
The most familiar delegations are those made to administrative agencies. 
When the legislature vests authority in an agency to make rules, adjudicate 
disputes, and enforce the law, the legislature relies on the expertise of agency 
officials to act in accordance with its statutory obligations. At times, 
legislatures explicitly require agencies to employ people with subject matter 
expertise. For example, Congress requires members of the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board to be “respected experts in the field of nuclear safety 
.	.	.	.”28 Similarly, Congress requires the Administrator of the EPA to appoint 
a committee to advise it on air quality standards that includes “at least one 
member of the National Academy of Sciences, one physician, and one	person 
representing State air pollution control agencies.”29 Even without an explicit 
legislative requirement, agency personnel develop expertise by drawing on 
expert views from within the government and by interacting with outside 
scientists and members of industry.30 
 
26 See DAVID S. SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES 
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 10 (1993) (criticizing broad delegations of authority); JOHN HART 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 132-34 (1980) (same). 
27 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 81, 95-96 (1985) (arguing that delegation improves the responsiveness of 
government by focusing the electorate on the President); Rossi, supra note 1, at 1179 (arguing that 
agency structure helps agencies make decisions more efficiently than the legislature because of lower 
monitoring and supervision costs); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1744-50 (2002) (arguing that it is impractical for a principal to 
spell out all commands to an agent in great detail); Bamberger, supra note 21, at 390 (arguing that 
regulated parties often have greater knowledge and expertise than government regulators about 
highly technical subject matters). 
28 42 U.S.C. §	2286(b)(1). 
29 Id. §	7409(d)(2)(A). For more on agency expertise, and challenges to it, see Wendy E. 
Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Power, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2019, 2027-28 (2015). 
30 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1840-41 (2013) (describing the role of the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) as an information aggregator, consolidating information from other agencies as well 
as overseeing the public comment process); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model 
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1.  Diminished Political Accountability 
Delegation to agencies has been criticized for disrupting the chain of 
political accountability that connects the people and their representatives. 
When a member of the legislature supports or opposes a policy, constituents 
can learn of the legislator’s position, including any votes he or she casts. As a 
result, constituents can reward or punish the legislator if they agree or 
disagree with these decisions. This direct connection between the people and 
their representatives reinforces political accountability and helps ensure that 
elected representatives in fact represent their constituents’ views.31 
By contrast, when the legislature delegates policymaking authority to 
agencies, it obscures the actor responsible for policy decisions. If voters 
disagree with a policy choice, whom do they blame? The legislature itself 
didn’t make the choice and the agency head ultimately responsible for the 
choice was not voted in—and cannot be voted out—by the public. For 
delegations of federal authority, voters can punish the President for an 
agency’s choice,32 but the connection between the President and the agency 
decision is tenuous. The vast majority of agency decisions, even if reviewable 
by a presidentially appointed agency head who can be removed by the 
President, are made in the first instance by agency personnel who are not 
appointed by the President.33 
Relatedly, agency delegation has also been criticized for allowing the 
legislature to avoid scrutiny for difficult policy decisions. When the 
legislature enacts a statute vesting broad authority in an agency, the 
legislature can claim credit for addressing a problem without actually doing 
the hard work of balancing competing interests. When the agency works out 
 
of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1427-28 (2013) (describing the rulemaking 
teams agencies typically use to develop rules, often consisting of “members from various offices within 
the agency, each with its own expertise and professional outlook”). 
31 See Cass R. Sunstein, Forward: The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1181, 1189-90 (2018) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine’s “most important goal is to ensure a 
certain kind of accountability—the kind that comes from the special safeguards to which Congress is 
subject”); David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 470-71 (2011) (arguing that 
“when elected legislators transfer the right to make policy decisions to unelected bureaucrats, they 
sever [the] essential link” between government and popular will). 
32 See Mashaw, supra note 27, at 95 (“All we need do is not forget there are also presidential 
elections and that . . . presidents are heads of administrations.”). 
33 See Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 
107 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 153-54 (2019) (“[T]he vast majority of agency adjudications and federal 
regulatory actions do not involve APA-governed formal adjudications before an ALJ or the agency 
itself.”); Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1654-1662 (2016) 
(describing Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) and Administrative Judges (AJs) and the number of 
and types of cases they hear). 
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the details, inevitably drawing criticism from at least some segment of the 
population, it is the agency rather than the legislature that takes the blame.34 
2.  Harm to Liberty Interests 
Delegation has also been criticized for harming liberty interests by making 
government action easy to accomplish. The passage of legislation is difficult 
because of the sheer number of people who must agree before it is enacted.35 
For one reason, members of the legislature may genuinely disagree on a 
proposed policy or represent constituencies with different policy preferences. 
Moreover, even agreement by a significant majority of members of the 
legislature may be insufficient to accomplish the enactment of a bill. Because 
of chamber rules—for example, the supermajority required to defeat a filibuster 
in the United States Senate—“many measures with broad and deep support” 
fail to pass.36 And, of course, bicameralism and presentment requirements 
mean that agreement must be shared by three separate institutions with 
different members, different constituencies, and different interests. 
Compared with the legislature, it is relatively easy for an agency to act. 
Because there are few required processes to slow them down, agencies 
conduct countless informal adjudications every year, including adjudicating 
private claims and assessing and enforcing penalties.37 Even more time-
consuming action, like rulemaking, is also relatively simple compared with 
legislation. Because agency heads vested with rulemaking authority also have 
the authority to direct agency personnel, they can direct the drafting of an 
administrative rule and guide it through the notice and comment process with 
efficiency. This hierarchical arrangement avoids the multiple veto points that 
impede legislation. Not surprisingly, the relative ease with which agencies act 
leads to far more agency action than statutory law. To the extent that 
increased government involvement is equated with a decrease in liberty (a 
premise certainly open to challenge), the relative ease with which agencies 
act is deleterious to liberty. 
 
34 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 26, at 10 (describing how broad delegations allow legislatures 
to avoid political accountability); Rao, supra note 19, at 1478-79 (arguing that delegation may allow 
Congress to avoid responsibility for difficult regulatory decisions, shifting the responsibility for 
regulatory costs to agencies). For example, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act granted 
broad authority to the agency to issue safety regulations. When the agency’s safety standard proved 
highly unpopular to consumers, Congress amended the statute to undo the agency’s decision. Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 36 (1983). 
35 Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1190. 
36 JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 296-97 (2017). 
37 See Barnett, supra note 33, at 1646-47 (noting that “more than 550,000” informal 
adjudications take place annually, and that these include oral hearings over which ALJs and AJs 
preside “to award benefits and licenses, enforce agency penalties, and adjudicate claims primarily 
between private parties”). 
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B.  Delegation to Private Parties 
Legislatures also vest authority in private parties. Private delegation takes 
many forms, but like delegation to agencies, legislatures delegate to private 
parties to take advantage of their expertise.38 Consider the federal 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA), which authorizes the 
Department of Agriculture to issue marketing orders to regulate particular 
agricultural commodities.39 Before a proposed order can be finalized, the 
Secretary of Agriculture must obtain approval from private groups of 
producers and handlers of the target commodity.40 This delegation ensures 
not only that the views of market participants are taken into consideration, 
but also that the final order reflects the expertise of “those with the most 
intimate knowledge” of commodity market conditions.41 Similarly, many 
states have adopted industrial codes, like the National Electrical Code.42 This 
Code is promulgated by a private group that includes “electrical contractors, 
inspectors, manufacturers, utilities, testing laboratories, regulatory agencies, 
insurance organizations, organized labor, and consumer groups” who jointly 
develop its details.43 Like these delegations, legislatures frequently delegate 
policymaking authority to private groups to formulate rules within their areas 
of expertise, like accreditation44 and medical standards.45 
1.  Self-dealing 
Delegations to private parties have been criticized even more consistently 
than agency delegations. Commentators’ primary concern is one of self-dealing;46 
 
38 See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 656-57 
(1986) (discussing the potential benefit for private delegation to provide access to specialized expertise 
otherwise unavailable to the government); Abramson, supra note 20, at 179 (“The first, and probably 
primary, reason Congress delegates governmental tasks to public regulators is their expertise. This 
expertise rationale is also used to justify reliance on private regulators.” (footnote omitted)). 
39 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 137, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); see, e.g., Lion Raisins, Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 391, 
393 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (“The AMAA .	.	. provide[s] the Secretary with the authority to impose volume 
regulations to promote orderly marketing conditions and stabilize the price of raisins.”). 
40 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act ch. 296. 
41 Harold J. Krent, The Private Performing the Public: Delimiting Delegations to Private Parties, 65 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 520-22 (2011). 
42 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL CODE (Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n 2020). 
43 Lawrence, supra note 38, at 689. 
44 See, e.g., In re Hansen, 275 N.W.2d 790, 796-97 (Minn. 1978) (upholding a delegation to a 
“nongovernmental body with expertise in the area of legal education”). 
45 See, e.g., Protz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 161 A.3d 827, 830 (Pa. 2017) (invalidating a 
statute requiring physicians to adopt American Medical Association impairment methodology). 
46 See Horton, supra note 31, at 473 (explaining that private parties “have fundamentally 
different incentives” than legislators or bureaucrats, in that they “select regulation that provides 
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that is, when a private delegate has the authority to affect the substance of 
government rules, the delegate is well-positioned to use this power for its own 
economic advantage. The concern with self-dealing was raised squarely by the 
Supreme Court in Carter v. Carter Coal, when it noted that delegation of the 
power to fix terms of employment in the coal industry to a group of coal 
producers and miners was “not even delegation to an official or an official body, 
presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and 
often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business.”47 
The Court’s concern in Carter was based on the distinction between the 
incentives and obligations of agency officials and, on the other hand, those of 
private parties. While agency officials are bound by an obligation to regulate 
in the public interest, private parties are not similarly bound.48 As a result, 
private delegates, as opposed to public delegates, have every incentive to 
“select regulation that provides them with maximum benefits without 
considering the effect on the other regulated parties or the public.”49 Consider 
the agricultural marketing orders noted above: the producers, who must 
approve a proposed order by a supermajority, have every incentive to hold 
out for favorable regulation rather than acquiesce in public-regarding 
regulation if it is against their self-interest.50 
2.  Even Less Political Accountability 
The political accountability concerns that exist in the context of agency 
delegation are magnified in the context of private delegations. Most saliently, 
private individuals are not bound by the same rules as public officials. Public 
officials are bound by an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of their office,51 
connecting their service morally, if not legally, to the public interest. Private 
delegates, by contrast, are not bound to serve the public interest in this way.52 
Similarly, private delegates are not subject to the provisions of the Constitution 
 
them with maximum benefits without considering the effect on the other regulated parties or the 
public” (internal citation omitted)). 
47 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). 
48 See 5 U.S.C. §	3331 (requiring executive officers to take an oath to faithfully discharge their 
duties); Krent, supra note 41, at 510 (“[P]rivate parties are less electorally accountable, less subject 
to bureaucratic constraints, and may be less motivated to serve the public good than are independent 
administrative agencies.”). 
49 Horton, supra note 31, at 473. 
50 SCHOENBROD, supra note 26, at 3-4 (describing negative effects of delegation of authority 
to promulgate agricultural marketing orders). 
51 5 U.S.C. §	3331. 
52 See Calvin R. Massey, The Non-Delegation Doctrine and Private Parties, 17 GREEN BAG 2d 157, 
167-68 (2014) (“[D]elegation to private entities raises the specter of a cession of power to unelected 
and politically unaccountable persons who have every incentive to exercise the delegated power for 
their own ends.”). 
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that constrain official action, like the Due Process Clause.53 Likewise, they need 
not comply with statutory constraints on the agency decision-making process, 
like those imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act.54 
Moreover, even though agency personnel are unelected, agency heads can 
be removed by the President or through the impeachment process.55 By 
contrast, removing a private delegate does not come with the same weighty 
mark of public disapproval. And while the President’s connection to agency 
action is attenuated, the President’s connection to the action of private parties 
is nonexistent. As a result, delegation to private parties cuts the President out 
of the process of regulation and deprives the public of the meaningful ability 
to punish the President for the delegate’s action.56 
III.  DELEGATION TO NONEXPERTS 
Whether composed of private citizens or public officials, the typical delegate 
is an institution with expertise in the subject matter it regulates. But, while 
delegation to experts is the rule, it is also possible for a legislature to delegate 
policymaking authority to an institution without expertise in the matters it 
regulates. This model of delegation can be called delegation to nonexperts. 
The rest of this Essay will describe and begin the project of evaluating 
delegation to nonexperts. As an initial matter, I offer two caveats about the 
scope of this Essay. First, not every process that takes the views of nonexperts 
into account is a delegation for the purposes of this Essay. In both federal57 
and state58 rulemaking processes, for example, views of the public, including 
nonexperts, are solicited as part of the notice and comment process. Although 
an agency is not required to alter a proposed rule because of public comments, 
it must take them seriously by responding to significant comments.59 
 
53 Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1379, 1387 (2006) (“[T]he Constitution does not prescribe how private individuals or private 
organizations are to treat each other; rather, only governmental action is subject to the requirements 
of the Constitution.” (emphasis omitted)). 
54 See Horton, supra note 31, at 472-73 (explaining that the Administrative Procedure Act does 
not bind private parties). 
55 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492-93 (2010) (describing 
the President’s removal authority); U.S. CONST. art. I, §	2 (noting the House’s impeachment 
power); id. §	3 (“The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.”). 
56 Krent, supra note 41, at 532, 536 (arguing that delegation to private parties “does not trigger 
the President’s appointment and removal authorities”). 
57 See 5 U.S.C. §	553(c) (requiring that agencies “give interested persons an opportunity to 
participate in .	.	. rule making” and “consider[] .	.	. the relevant matter presented.”). 
58 REVISED MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, art. 3 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2010) (describing the procedural requirements for state rulemaking, including the 
requirements for notice and comment). 
59 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (“An agency must consider and respond 
to significant comments received during the period for public comment.”). 
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Nevertheless, I do not consider this a delegation because public comments 
themselves cannot stop the promulgation process. Accordingly, this Essay 
will not address the many ways in which delegates solicit and consider the 
views of nonexperts when those nonexperts themselves play no official role 
in taking final agency action. 
Second, just like expert delegates, nonexperts can be either public officials or 
private citizens. For example, many state statutes permit committees composed 
of legislators or executive branch officials to alter or veto administrative rules. 
These statutes allow administrative rules informed by the “technical expertise of 
specialist bureaucrats” to be modified or vetoed by committees whose members 
do not have a comparable level of expertise.60 Delegations to nonexpert public 
officials, including these types of committees, have different features, and raise 
different concerns, than delegations to nonexpert private parties. As described 
above, unlike private delegates, public officials have an obligation to act in the 
public interest.61 Because of these different characteristics, in this Essay I only 
consider nonexpert private delegations. 
Delegation to nonexperts, as defined above, can be illustrated by a recent 
innovation in Michigan’s rulemaking process. The Michigan legislature has 
delegated rulemaking authority over environmental matters to a committee 
whose members have limited expertise in the subject matters it regulates. 
Michigan’s Environmental Rules Review Committee (Review Committee) 
oversees rulemaking conducted by the Michigan Department of 
Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE).62 The Review Committee 
has authority to determine whether EGLE’s proposed rules are consistent 
with law; whether they are “necessary and suitable” in light of the costs they 
are likely to impose; and whether they “are based on sound and objective 
scientific reasoning.”63 If the Review Committee determines that a proposed 
rule does not meet these criteria, it has multiple opportunities to influence, 
delay, and even derail the proposed rule.64 
 
60 Neal D. Woods, Separation of Powers and the Politics of Administrative Rule Review, 15 ST. POL. 
& POL’Y Q. 345, 348 (2015). I also exclude OIRA from my definition of nonexpert delegation. 
Although OIRA is headed by a political appointee and lacks the substantive expertise of regulating 
agencies, it has career staff with substantive expertise and collects expert information from different 
agencies during rulemaking. Sunstein, supra note 30, at 1871. 
61 See supra text accompanying notes 50-55. 
62 S. 652 §	65(19), 99th Leg., Reg. Session (Mich. 2018). At the time the Review Committee 
was created, the Department was known as the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. 
63 Id. §	66(4). There are also other findings, not discussed here, that the Review Committee 
must make. See id. 
64 After the Review Committee objects to a proposed rule, EGLE must address these concerns 
by revising the rule or providing it with more information. Id. §	66(6). After public comment, the 
Review Committee has the opportunity to derail the finalized rule by rejecting it or suggesting 
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Despite the fact that the Review Committee must make legal, scientific, 
and cost-benefit determinations, and despite its power over the rulemaking 
process, the Review Committee’s members, by statutory design, have limited 
expertise in the matters it oversees. Two of the Review Committee’s members 
must be members of the public and one must be a small business owner;65 
none of these three are likely to have any expertise in the subject matters that 
the Review Committee regulates. Moreover, most of the Review Committee’s 
other members are representatives of various industrial groups—for example, 
waste management, manufacturing, oil and gas, and agriculture.66 Although 
these industry representatives likely will have some expertise in 
environmental issues that impact their industries, none will have expertise in 
the vast majority of subject matters that the Review Committee oversees, 
which include drinking water, dams, dunes, floodplains, shipping, wetland 
management, and countless other matters.67 
Perhaps the modicum of expertise required of some of the members of 
the Review Committee saves it from the label “nonexpert.” Even so, the 
Review Committee can be considered “proof of concept”: that is, the 
mismatch between the significant rulemaking responsibility of the Review 
Committee and its lack of institutional expertise suggest that legislatures may 
be willing to go further to delegate authority to private parties with no 
expertise. State and federal responses to the recent COVID-19 pandemic 
further confirm this likelihood. As noted above, some government officials 
have demonstrated a great willingness to disregard and even undermine 
expert institutions in favor of following admittedly nonexpert courses of 
action.68 Part IV evaluates the consequences of a legislature’s decision to 
delegate authority to nonexperts. 
IV.  EVALUATING DELEGATION TO NONEXPERTS 
Delegation to nonexperts has different characteristics than delegation to 
experts, whether public or private. It is therefore not surprising that 
 
modifications, forcing EGLE to attempt to reconcile these differences. Id. §	66(9). In total, the 
Review Committee can delay the rule by more than a year and force EGLE into one of three 
unenviable choices: it may give up and withdraw its proposed rule, appeal to the governor to override 
the Review Committee, or begin the rulemaking process anew. Id. §	66(11). 
65 Id. §	65(2). This description is not meant to disparage any particular member of the 
Review Committee. 
66 Id. 
67 Of the twelve voting members, only two might have experience with a broader array of 
environmental issues: one must represent an environmental organization and one must represent a 
land conservancy organization. Id. And while the group will also include science advisors and agency 
employees, these members may not vote. Id. §§	65(4), 65(13). 
68 See supra text accompanying notes 5-9. 
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delegation to nonexperts can be criticized for some, but not all, of the same 
reasons as delegation to experts. Moreover, delegation to nonexperts also 
raises some unique concerns. This Part will compare the concerns raised by 
delegation to experts to those raised by delegation to nonexperts. 
A.  No Accountability 
The accountability concerns that accompany agency and private 
delegations are even more severe when the delegate is not an expert. As noted 
above,69 agency delegates are unelected and private delegates are not bound 
by oath to pursue the public interest. Despite these characteristics, however, 
expert delegates, both public and private, share a characteristic that increases 
the likelihood that they will act in the public interest. Expert delegates of all 
kinds are held accountable by their common interest in cultivating a 
reputation for expertise in the subject matter of the delegation. 
A reputation for expertise is a significant component of an agency’s 
regulatory success. As a result, agency officials value and cultivate their 
agency’s reputation for expertise.70 For example, the FDA’s reputation causes 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to self-regulate, “abandon[ing] hundreds if not 
thousands of new therapeutic ideas every year” to avoid FDA rejection.71 This 
self-regulation makes the FDA’s regulatory role easier by eliminating the need 
for it to make approval decisions in marginal cases that firms could, but do 
not, present to it.72 Private delegates have a similar incentive to maintain a 
reputation for expertise. The private group that promulgates the National 
Electrical Code, for example, has an incentive to draft a Code that is efficient 
and effective. If it fails to do so, its reputation (and the reputation of its 
employees and members) will suffer and it will cease to be considered an 
expert in the field; ultimately, states might withdraw their delegations from it. 
Nonexpert delegates, like agency delegates, are unelected; and like private 
delegates more generally, they are not bound by oath to pursue the public 
interest. But, unlike either agency or private expert delegates, nonexpert 
delegates are unconstrained by reputational concerns. Like the members of 
Michigan’s Review Committee, a nonexpert delegate’s position may last only 
a few years and is not the delegate’s primary source of income, professional 
contacts, or, likely, professional satisfaction. As a result, a nonexpert 
delegate’s professional reputation will not suffer for failing to regulate 
effectively. Indeed, it would be perverse for the reputation of nonexperts to 
 
69 Supra Part II. 
70 See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER 10-11, 33-34, 46-47 (2010) (describing 
the relationship between an agency’s reputation and its regulatory power). 
71 Id. at 16. 
72 Id. 
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suffer simply because they failed to understand complex scientific, economic, 
and legal concepts; such specialized matters are simply outside of their areas 
of knowledge. Moreover, even removal from his or her position, which could 
be a career-ending blow to a public official, is hardly consequential for 
nonexperts. Even if removed, nonexperts are free to continue their normal 
professional lives without interruption. Because a nonexpert has little 
affirmative incentive to regulate responsibly, and will suffer little consequence 
for failing to do so, the reputational accountability that constrains public and 
private expert delegates is absent from the nonexpert delegate. Because 
nonexperts lack this reputation constraint, and because they also are 
unelected and are not bound by oath to pursue the public interest, nonexperts 
have even less accountability than their expert counterparts. 
B.  Limited Self-dealing 
Although delegation to nonexperts exacerbates problems of 
accountability, it mitigates the problems of self-dealing that affect private 
delegations. As noted above,73 private delegates generally have an incentive 
to “select regulation that provides them with maximum benefits without 
considering the effect on the other regulated parties or the public.”74 This 
concern is rooted in the assumption that private delegates have the expertise 
that makes them attractive delegates precisely because they participate in the 
line of business that they regulate.75 It follows from this assumption that 
private delegates have an incentive to regulate for their own benefit. 
In the case of delegations to nonexperts, however, self-dealing concerns 
are limited or nonexistent. Nonexpert delegates are not likely to be in the 
line of business that they regulate. (If they were, they would likely have some 
expertise, after all.) Accordingly, nonexpert delegates are not likely to have a 
financial interest in their regulatory decisions beyond an interest as members 
of the public. As a result, the nonexpert delegate can be expected to regulate 
without the specter of self-dealing that clouds other private delegations. 
Consider, again, Michigan’s Review Committee. Although some of the 
committee’s members do work in lines of business that may be particularly 
affected by the environmental regulations they oversee, many others do not.76 
They will not, therefore, be in a position to self-deal. Moreover, even the 
Review Committee’s members who work in industries affected by 
 
73 Supra Part II.B.1. 
74 Horton, supra note 31, at 473. 
75 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (discussing the conflict created by 
delegating to private parties, namely that the private persons often participate in the industry they are 
regulating and therefore “may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business”). 
76 S. 652 §	65(2), 99th Leg., Reg. Session (Mich. 2018). 
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environmental regulations will be self-interested only in a small fraction of 
cases that the Review Committee addresses. As noted, Michigan’s EGLE 
regulates many subjects that are of little interest to the Review Committee’s 
industrial members.77 As a result, even the industrial members of the Review 
Committee can be expected to be self-interested only rarely. 
C.  Inexpert and Arbitrary Agency Action 
Delegation to nonexperts is likely to lead to regulation that is both inexpert 
and, more distressingly, arbitrary. As noted above, legislatures delegate 
authority to other bodies, whether public or private, to take advantage of the 
delegate’s expertise. Agencies are well-situated to develop expertise due to 
their ability to solicit comments and advice from members of industry and 
other government agencies78 and their “capacity to devote extended time and 
attention to specific problems.”79 Private delegates, moreover, are more likely 
to have first-hand experience with the problems they regulate,80 are better able 
to represent the interests of affected industry members,81 and have highly 
specialized knowledge unavailable to government regulators.82 
Nonexpert delegates have the advantages of neither agency nor private 
delegates. Because they are not experts in the fields they regulate, nonexpert 
delegates lack highly specialized knowledge, are unlikely to have first-hand 
experience with the problems they regulate, and do not represent the interests 
of affected industry members. Even if a nonexpert delegate did have the 
resources to research and collect pertinent information, it would have little 
incentive to do so. For the same reasons that nonexpert delegates are unlikely 
to self-deal (no special interest in the outcome of the regulation), they have 
little incentive to invest resources in developing expertise in the subject 
matter of the delegation. Because nonexpert delegates do not have, and likely 
will not develop, expertise in the subject matter of the delegation, they are 
likely to reach decisions that do not reflect subject-matter expertise. 
A related and potentially more serious risk created by delegation to 
nonexperts is the risk of arbitrary regulation. When elaborating on the 
 
77 See supra text accompanying notes 66-68. 
78 See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2413 (2019) (“Agencies (unlike courts) can conduct 
factual investigations, can consult with affected parties, can consider how their experts have handled 
similar issues over the long course of administering a regulatory program.”); cf. Sunstein, supra note 
30, at 1841 (discussing OIRA’s role as an information aggregator, including its role assisting agencies 
in processing and addressing public comments).  
79 Bamberger, supra note 21, at 401. 
80 Abramson, supra note 20, at 179. 
81 Krent, supra note 41, at 522. 
82 Bamberger, supra note 21, at 390. 
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Administrative Procedure Act83 in State Farm, the Supreme Court identified 
situations in which agency rulemaking decisions will be considered “arbitrary 
and capricious”: 
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has 
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation 
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so 
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product 
of agency expertise.84 
Although the Supreme Court has not read this language as broadly as it 
might,85 nonexpert delegate action is likely to be arbitrary and capricious 
under even a modest version of State Farm. Implicitly or explicitly, 
legislatures require delegates to make policy decisions based on legal, 
scientific, economic, or other considerations.86 Nonexpert delegates, however, 
do not have expertise in the disciplines that the legislature expects will inform 
their decisions. As a result, even well-intentioned nonexpert delegates are apt 
to inadvertently rely on factors the legislature did not intend them to consider 
when making decisions. For this same reason, it is also likely that nonexpert 
delegates will fail to consider important aspects of the problems placed before 
them. Indeed, nonexpert delegates may fail even to recognize important issues 
because of their lack of expertise. Finally, if the data and arguments presented 
to them are intended for experts, nonexpert delegates are liable to 
misinterpret and misapply them. As a result, nonexpert delegates may make 
decisions or offer explanations that run counter to evidence presented to 
them. For all of these reasons, decisions by nonexpert delegates run a 
significant risk of being arbitrary and capricious.87 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Delegation of authority to nonexperts has different characteristics than 
delegation to experts, either public or private. Concerns about accountability 
are more acute in the context of nonexperts. Conversely, the self-dealing 
concerns associated with private delegates are minimal or absent for 
 
83 See 5 U.S.C. §	706 (providing that courts should set aside “agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be arbitrary [and] capricious”). 
84 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
85 See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION 191 (2016) (recounting the government’s 
high success rate in State Farm challenges). 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
87 Cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (describing the arbitrary and capricious standard). 
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nonexpert delegates. And the risk of inexpert and arbitrary agency action is 
pervasive for nonexpert delegates. 
While this Essay provided a sketch of the issues associated with 
delegation to nonexperts, there is more work to be done on this subject. This 
Essay, therefore, can be considered an introduction to a much broader topic. 
Future study into delegation to nonexperts should include the following: 
• Delegation to Nonexperts and the Death of Expertise: Recent scholarly 
work documents the popular rejection of expertise in politics, 
medicine, law, and other fields. Future work could investigate how 
delegation to nonexperts fits with this broader trend. 
• Delegation to Nonexperts and the Nondelegation Doctrine: The 
nondelegation doctrine is in flux. After the Supreme Court’s recent 
Gundy opinion, the Court is expected to breathe new life into the 
long dormant doctrine. Future work could explore whether it would 
be appropriate for the courts to apply an enhanced version of the 
nondelegation doctrine to nonexpert delegates. 
• Delegation to Nonexperts and Reputational Costs: The effectiveness of 
agency regulation heavily depends on the agency’s reputation for 
expertise. Future work could investigate whether delegation to 
nonexperts negatively affects the agency’s ability to regulate effectively. 
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